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THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER
THE NATIONAL POLICE POWER UNDER THE TAX-
ING CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION*
WHEN the United States Supreme Court decided in the sum-
mer of 1918 that the Keating-Owen Act,' closing the channels
of interstate commerce to the products of mines and factories
employing child labor, was an attempt by Congress to exercise
a power not confided to it by the constitution and was therefore
null and void,2 the child labor exterminators, in Congress and
out, apparently undismayed, girt up their loins and sallied forth
on what one of them aptly termed "a quest of constitutionality." s
There seemed to be no thought that Congress should abandon its
efforts to prohibit child labor; the problem merely resolved itself
into one of method. One method had failed and another must
be found. 4 Accordingly a rather astonishing variety of proposals
was brought forward in the hope that an effective and at the
same time constitutional federal child labor law might be evolved.
Three resolutions were introduced proposing a child labor amend-
ment to the national constitution.' Senator Owen demanded
the reenactment of the Keating-Owen Act with an added pro-
vision that no judge should have the power to declare it uncon-
stitutional.6 Also a bill embodying the principle of the Webb-
*This article, though complete in itself, is a development of the topic
of National Police Power under the Commerce Clause, 3 MINNESOTA
LAW REvrEw 289, 381, 452.
' Act of September 1, 1916, Chap. 432, 39 Stat. at L. 675.
2 Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 38 S.
C. R. 529.
3 Title of an article by Raymond G. Fuller, in Child Labor Bulletin,
Nov., 1918, Vol. 7, 207.
4 Senator Lodge declared in the Senate debate on the Child Labor Tax
(see infra note 10), "The main purpose is to put a stop to what seems to
be a very great evil and one that ought to be in some way put a stop to.
If we are unable to reach it constitutionally in any other way, then I am
willing to reach it by the taxing power, which the courts have held can be
used constitutionally for such a purpose. I see no other way to do it."
Cong. Rec., Dec. 18, 1918, Vol. 57, 611.
5House Joint Resolution 300, introduced by Mr. Mason (Ill.), Cong.
Rec., June 11, 1918, Vol. 56, 7652; House Joint Resolution 302, Mr. Rogers
(Mass.), ibid, 7776; House Joint Resolutions 304, Mr. Fall (Pa.), ibid,
7776.
6 Cong. Rec., June 6, 1918, Vol. 56, 7418, Sen. bill 4671. Debated June
6, 1918, ibid, 7431, 7435.
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Kenyon Act was introduced, forbidding the shipment of the
products of child labor into states which prohibit the employment
of children.7 Again it was proposed that the use of the mails
be denied to the employers of children.' Still another bill relied
upon the war power as a basis for a flat prohibition of child labor
by declaring such a prohibition necessary for "conserving the
man power of the nation and thereby more effectually providing
for the national security and defense."9  Finally, proposals were
made to drive child labor out of existence by use of the federal
power of taxation;. and when the Revenue Act of February 24,
1919, was passed, it contained provisions placing an excise tax
of ten per cent upon the net profits of mining and manufacturing
establishments employing children.10
Within three months of the enactment of this law it, was
declared unconstitutional by a federal district judge in North
Carolina on the ground that it was an invasion of the domain of
7 Sen. bill 4762, June 27, 1918, by Mr. Pomerene. Referred to Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce. Cong. Rec., Vol. 56, 8341. See comments
in Survey, June 15, 1918, p. 324.
8 Sen. bills 4732, 4760, June 27, 1918, by Mr. Kenyon. Referred to
Committee on P. 0. and P. Roads. Cong. Rec., Vol. 56, 8341.
9 House bill 12767, Aug. 15, 1918, by Mr. Keating (Col.), Cong. Rec.,
Vol. 56, 9238. Text of this bill is reprinted in Child Labor Bulletin, Aug.,
1918, Vol. 7, 98.
10 On June 27, 1918, Mr. Pomerene introduced a bill to tax the employ-
ment of children (S. R. 4763) which was referred to Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, Cong. Rec., Vol. 56, 8341. On Nov. 15, 1918, he intro-
duced a similar measure drafted in collaboration with Senators Kenyon
and Lenroot as an amendment to the general revenue bill (H.' R. 12863).
This amendment was finally enacted.
The pertinent part of the act as passed is the first section, Act of Feb.
24, 1919, 40 Stat. at L. 1138. It reads as follows: "Every person (other than
a bona fide boys' or girls' canning club recognized by the Agricultural
Department of a State and of the United States) operating (a) any mine
or quarry situated in the United States in which children under the age
of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work during any
portion of the taxable year; or (b) any mill, cannery, workshop, factory,
or manufacturing establishment situated in the United States in which
children under the age of fourteen years have been employed or per-
mitted to work, or children between the ages of fourteen and sixteen
have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any
day or more than six days in any week, or after the hour of seven o'clock
post meridian, or before the hour of six o'clock ante meridian, during any
portion of the taxable year, shall pay for each taxable year, in addition
to all other taxes imposed by law, an excise tax equivalent to 10 per
centum of the entire net profits received or accrued for such year from
the sale or disposition of the product of such mine, quarry, mill, cannery,
workshop, factory or manufacturing establishment."
Other proposals for destroying child labor by taxation were made in
Congress. Two bills (H. R. 12705, 13087) introduced by Mr. Green (Ia.)
and Mr. Gard (Ohio) provided for the taxation of articles of interstate
commerce in the manufacture of which child labor is employed. Cong.
Rec., Vol. 56, 9051, 11310. It was proposed by Mr. Mason (Ill.) to levy
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state authority." At the time of the writing of this article an
appeal from this decision is pending before the Supreme Court
of the United States.
It would seem that in no case could the question be more
squarely raised whether there are any constitutional limitations
upon tHe purposes for which Congress may use its power to tax.
The friends of this law do not claim that it was designed for the
purpose of raising revenue, or for any other purpose than the
destruction of child labor." If it should be held that this is a
constitutional use of the taxing power it follows that there is
stored up in the power to tax a most substantial fund of con-
gressional authority to deal with social and economic problems,
a police power more comprehensive and far-reaching in scope
than can be derived from any other grant of power to Congress. 13
It is the purpose of this article to examine the nature of such
national police power as may be derived from the power to tax
and to determine what are the limitations, if there be any, to
which that power is subject.
THE CLAUSE GRANTING THE POWER TO TAX
Congressional authority to tax is granted in the following
words of the federal constitution: "The Congress shall have
Power (1) To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense
and general Welfare of the United States."' 4 For what seems
at first glance to be a perfectly straightforward and unambig-
uous statement, this brief sentence has given rise to a surprising
number of constitutional controversies of the very first magni-
tude. These disputes have related to two entirely separate
a tax of two dollars per day on all who employ children. Cong. Rec.,
Vol. 56, Appendix, 461.
11 May 2, 1919. The decision was handed down by judge James E.
Boyd, who rendered the district court decision in Dagenhart v. Hammer,
invalidating the Keating-Owen Act. No opinion was written and the facts
set forth above are based on press reports. See New York Times, May
2, 1919.
12 With the possible exception of its author, Senator Pomerene, who
insisted that the purpose of its enactment was two-fold, to raise revenue
and to destroy child labor. He expressed the belief that it would produce
some revenue. Cong. Rec., Dec. 18, 1918, Vol. 57, 613.
13 See articles by the writer on National Police Power under the Com-
merce Clause of the Constitution, (1919) 3 MINNEsoTA LAW RmE w,
289, 381, 452; Judge Charles M. Hough, Covert Legislation and the Con-
stitution, (1917) 30 Harvard Law Rev. 801; Paul Fuller, Is There a
National Police Power? (1904) 4 Col. Law Rev. 563.
14 Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 1.
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aspects of the taxing power."5 In the first place, there has been
bitter disagreement as to the purposes for which Congress is
authorized to raise revenue. In other words, what may Con-
gress legitimately do with the money raised by taxation? In
respect to this question, which is not the one under considera-
tion, we may merely note in passing that the following principles
are now settled: First, the clause, "to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States," is not a separate grant of general legislative power, but
is a statement of limitation indicating the purposes for which
Congress may use the power to "lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts and excises." In short, Congress may lay and collect
taxes in order to pay the debts and provide for the common
defense and general welfare. 6 Second, Congress is not limited
in the purposes for which it may spend money raised by taxa-
tion to such purposes as are covered by the legislative powers
delegated to Congress by the constitution. It may spend money
not only to aid in the exercise of those delegated powers but
also for the more comprehensive and general objects of "pro-




15 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, I, Sec. 958.
10 No one has expressed this more clearly than Jefferson in his opinion
on the power of Congress to establish the Bank of the United States:
"To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States,
that is to say, 'to levy taxes for the purpose of providing for the general
welfare.' For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare
the purpose, for which the power is to be exercised. Congress are not to
lay taxes ad libitum, for any purpose they please; but only to pay the
debts, or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner they are
not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but
only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as
describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent
power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the
Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of
power completely useless" Jefferson's Correspondence, Vol. 4, 524, 525.
On the same point see Story, op. cit., Secs. 907-930; Miller on the Con-
stitution, 229; Hare American Constitutional Law, I, 241; Watson, Con-
stitution, I, 390; Black, Constitutional Law, 207; Tucker, Constitution,
I, 470; Federalist, No. 41.
Compare the opposite view of Chancellor Kent: "At present it will be
sufficient to observe, generally, that Congress are authorized to provide
for the common defense and general welfare; and for that purpose,
among other express grants, they are authorized to lay and collect taxes,
etc .. " Commentaries, 13th Ed., I, 259.
17 The classic argument in support of this position is that of President
Monroe in his message accompanying his veto of the Cumberland Road
Bill. Richardson: Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 164-167;
Hamilton's Report on Manufactures, Dec. 5, 1791, Works, Lodge Ed., Vol.
4, 151. See also Story, op. cit. Secs. 975-991; Willoughby, op. cit., I, 588.
For opposite view see Tucker, op. cit., I, 475.
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The second group of controversies over the meaning of the
taxing clause of the constitution has dealt, not with the question
of the purposes for which revenue may legitimately be raised by
taxation, but with the question whether or not Congress may
use the power to tax for purposes which do not include the raising
of any revenue at all, or include it only incidentally. For in-
stance, may Congress tax solely in order to promote industry,
or to drive out of existence practices or commodities injurious
to the national welfare? It is clear that the scope and nature
of any police power which Congress may enjoy under the taxing
clause will depend upon the extent to which it may use its power
to tax for purposes other than revenue.
The question of the purposes for which Congress may use the
power to tax has been answered with different degrees of con-
servatism. On the one hand are those who believe that this
power may be legitimately used only for the raising of revenue.
Midway, a more numerous group has urged that Congress may
properly tax for revenue and in addition to accomplish or pro-
mote any other legislative object within the enumerated powers
of Congress. Finally, the friends of the new child labor tax
and measures like it allege that Congress may levy taxes for the
purpose of regulating or controlling indirectly problems clearly
outside of its delegated legislative authority, provided that such
taxation has for its object providing for the common defense
and general welfare of the nation. An examination of the merits
of these three views in the light of the arguments advanced in
their support will help materially in determining whether or not
there is a national police power properly deducible from the con-
gressional power to tax; and if there is such a police power,
what, if any, are its limits.
TAXATION FOR REVENUE ONLY
The proposition that Congress may use its grant of taxing
power only to raise revenue is ancient and familiar doctrine. It
has served as an argument for over a hundred years to those
who have denied the constitutionality of the protective tariff.,8
To that end it was vigorously urged by Calhoun and his South
1s For analysis of arguments for and against the constitutionality of
protective tariffs, see passim Stanwood, Tariff Controversies in the United
States in the Nineteenth Century. See also arguments on this point in
Elliott's Debates, Vol. IV. Of course this is not the only argument
urged against the validity of such tariffs.
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Carolina adherents in 1829 during the critical period of the
nullification controversy;19 and it stood as a solemn pronuncia-
mento in the party platform on which President Wilson was
elected in 1912.20
It must not be assumed, however, that this view of the fed-
eral taxing power is the sole property of the free trader. It
is not even incompatible with a belief in the constitutional pro-
priety of protection. Nor does it place one in the position of
maintaining with an unyielding literalness that Congress may,
under no circumstances, impose a money exaction or tax for
a purpose other than revenue. The present day advocates of
this theory usually recognize that Congress may levy a tax to
make effective some other power delegated to Congress by the
constitution, such as the power to regulate commerce or to
control the currency. They insist, however, that in such cases
Congress has exercised not its delegated taxing power but its
commerce power or its currency power. In other words, the
power of taxation granted by article I, section 8 of the constitu-
tion is definitely limited to the laying of taxes for revenue only:
but in addition to this expressly delegated and definitely limited
power, there is derived from the other grants of congressional
authority an implied power to levy money exactions which may
be called taxes, so that a tax is constitutional which furthers any
object within the scope of the delegated powers of Congress
even though it is not levied by virtue of the taxing power spe-
cifically granted in article 1, section 8. To overlook this impor-
tant distinction puts the adherent of the "revenue only" theory
in an entirely false position.
This view that the power of taxation granted to Congress may
constitutionally be used only for the purpose of raising revenue
is supported by three main arguments which may be briefly
reviewed.21
1. In its commonly accepted meaning as well as by legal
definition, the term "taxation" is confined to the power of gov-
19 Works, VI, 1-59.
20 The Democratic Platform in 1912 contained the following d eclara-
tion: "We declare it to be a fundamental principle of the Democratic
Party that the Federal Government under the Constitution has no right
to impose or collect tariff duties except for the purpose of revenue. . ..
The Democratic Platform in 1892 contained a practically identical state-
ment.
21 For an excellent presentation of this whole theory of federal tax-
ation, see the valuable article by J. B. Waite, (1908) 6 Mich. Law Rev. 277.
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ernments to raise revenue. All the English dictionaries concur
in regarding the purpose of securing money as an inherent
attribute of a tax.22  The raising of revenue has been commonly
recognized as the sine qua non of the taxing power.23 This gen-
eral impression of the layman and the lexicographer has been
confirmed with definiteness and precision in the law, which has
recognized and emphasized the distinction between money ex-
actions for revenue purposes and money exactions imposed for
purposes of regulation or destruction. Charges of the first class
are based on the taxing power; those of the second class upon the
police power. Commentators24 and courts2 5 have again and again
insisted upon the observance of this classification. The state gov-
ernments possess, of course, a general police power for the pro-
tection of public health, safety, morals and welfare. As a neces-
sary and reasonable means of exercising this police power the
state may levy what, for want of a better term, may be called
taxes, which are prohibitive or repressive or regulatory in purpose
and effect. In the legal and constitutional sense these taxes are
to be regarded as police regulations, and not as exertions of the
power of the state to tax. To prove this it is merely necessary to
point out that these so-called "taxes" have been subjected to all the
constitutional limitations resting upon the police power and when
they have been imposed in a manner or for a purpose which can-
not be justified under the police power, the courts have not hesi-
22 Webster defines a tax as "a rate or sum of money assessed on the
person or property of a citizen by the government for the use of the
nation or state."
23While admitting that the purpose to raise revenue is a common
attribute of the taxing power, there are those who deny that it is an
essential attribute. See infra 261, 265.
24 "License fees, occupation taxes, inspection fees, and other like
exactions, which are not imposed for the purpose of raising revenue, but
for the proper regulation of matters deemed essential to the public safety,
health, or welfare, are not 'taxes' in the ordinary and proper sense of
that term, and are not governed by the constitutional rules and maxims
applicable to taxation, but by those which define and limit the exercise of
the police power." Black, Constitutional Law, 3d Ed., 467; Cooley, Con-
stitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. 283, n. 1, 709, n. 1, 713; Cooley on Taxa-
tion, 3d Ed. II, 1125; Freund, Police Power, Sec. 25; McClain, Consti-
tutional Law in the U. S., 133; 27 Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law & Proc.,
578; 37 "Cyc." 707.
25 Gundling v. Chicago, (1900) 177 U. S. 183, 189, 20 S. C. R. 633, 44
L. Ed. 725; Phillips v. Mobile, (1908) 208 U. S. 472, 478, 28 S. C. R. 370,
52 L. Ed. 578; Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, (1900) 179 U. S. 445,
45 L. Ed. 269, 21 S. C. R. 201; Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, (1904)
198 U. S. 17, 49 L. Ed. 925, 25 S. C. R. 552; Tanner v. Little, (1916) 240
U. S. 369, 60 L. Ed. 691, 36 S. C. R. 379.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tated to declare them unconstitutional.2 6  If, therefore, it should
be admitted that the power of taxation belonging to Congress is
exactly the same in nature and scope as that which the states en-
joy, a proposition which has been vigorously urged,27 it by no
means follows that that power affords any basis for the exercise
of a general federal police authority by means of regulatory and
prohibitive taxation. When the state lays a tax for police
purposes, it is exercising one of its admitted powers, the police
power. No one will deny that Congress, also, may lay taxes as a
means of carrying out its own granted powers.2 s But the use by
the state of the power to lay taxes in aid of an admitted state
power can furnish no authority for the exercise by Congress of
the power to levy taxes in aid of powers clearly not granted to
the national government.
To regard the power of taxation as in its very nature limited
to purposes of revenue is not to deny or discount the truth of
Marshall's famous dictum, "the power to tax is the power to de-
stroy."29 The two propositions are entirely compatible. This oft-
quoted maxim, instead of being regarded as a blanket authori-
zation of the unrestrained use of the taxing power for any and
all purposes irrespective of revenue, is more reasonably con-
strued as an epigrammatic statement of the political and eco-
nomic axiom that since the financial needs of a state or nation
may outrun any human calculation, so the power to meet those
needs by taxation must not be limited even though the taxes
become burdensome or confiscatory.20 To say that "the power
26 State v. Ashbrook, (1899) 154 Mo. 375, 55 S. W. 627, 48 L. R. A.
265, 77 A. S. R. 765; Sperry and Hutchinson v. Owensboro, (1912) 151
Ky. 389, 151 S. W. 932; Little v. Tanner, (1913) 208 Fed. 605 (over-
ruled in 240 U. S. 369 on other grounds). Earlier cases are cited by
Cooley, Taxation, II, 1140.
27 See infra, p. 267.
28 See infra, p. 261.
29 McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 316, 431, 4 L. Ed.
579; Weston v. City, Council of Charleston, (1829) 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed.
481. It should be noted that this statement is in reality obiter dictum.
What Marshall was proving was that a state could levy no tax whatever
on an instrumentality of the federal government even though the tax
was neither burdensome nor destructive. See article by T. R. Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of
the States, (1918) 31 Harvard Law. Rev. 321.
20 "The sense of the opinion is that, as a sovereign state, governments
may be pressed for money, each may take from its people a portion of
their possessions; that this right may be exercised again and again until
the whole of the property has been exhausted: In this sense there is a like
right in the federal government to destroy." Waite, op. cit., 6 Mich. Law
Rev. 292.
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to tax is the power to destroy" is to describe not the purposes
for which the taxing power may be used but the degree of vigor
with which the power may be employed in order to raise rev-
enue.3
2. It is urged, in the second place, that the framers of the
federal constitution intended to confer upon Congress the power
to tax only for the purpose of raising revenue. 32  It is true that
the clause granting this power contains language susceptible of
a 'more liberal construction. It authorizes the levying of taxes
"to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and gen-
eral welfare of the United States." The power described by these
words, however, is the power to tax for the purpose of securing
the necessary money with which to pay the public debts and pro-
vide for the common defense and general welfare. In other
words, "to provide for the common defense and general wel-
fare" is a statement of the objects for which money raised by
taxation may be spent rather than a statement of the objects for
which the power to tax may be used irrespective of revenue. It
is urged that such meagre evidence as is available regarding the
meaning attached to this clause by those who framed it3" and by
31 This view finds support in Marshall's further comment on the doc-
trine in the same case: "The people of a state, therefore, give to their
government a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the
exigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to
the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legis-
lator, and on the influence of the constituents over their representatives,
to guard them against its abuse." 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 428.
32 Waite, op. cit., 6 Mich. Law Rev. 284; Bruce, Interstate Commerce
and Child Labor, (1919) 3 MINNESoTA LAw RwvIw 101; Tucker, op.
cit., I, 478.
33 The problem of the purposes for which Congress was to be author-
ized to lay taxes evoked little discussion in the Convention of 1787. The
Virginia Plan as introduced by Randolph on May 29 contained no sep-
arate grant of the taxing power to Congress but provided "that the
National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights
vested in Congress by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all
cases to which the separate states are incompetent, etc.... ".Farrand,
Records of the Federal Convention, I, 21.
Section 2 of the New Jersey Plan introduced by Patterson on June
15 provided that Congress "be authorized to pass acts for raising a reve-
nue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandise of foreign
growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the United States, by
stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all letters
or packages passing through the general Postoffice, to be applied to such
federal purposes as they shall deem proper and expedient." Ibid, I, 243.
The plan for a new constitution proposed by Charles Pinckney on May
29, provided in Art. IV that "The legislature of the United States shall
have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises."
Ibid, III, 595. This was the form in which the clause was reported by
the Committee of Detail on Aug. 6. Ibid, II, 181. A further report
from the same committee on Aug. 22 added to the clause as quoted the
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those who. discussed it while ratification of the constitution was
pending 34 tends to support the view here urged. The clause was
placed in the constitution in order to remedy that serious defect of
the articles of confederation arising from the inability of Congress
to raise revenue directly. The new government must enjoy this
power to raise revenue, and these were the words in which that
power was conferred." That the framers did not intend to give
Congress a general police power to be exercised by means of
destructive or regulatory taxation is evidenced by two more def-
inite considerations. First, the fundamental principle on which the
new national government was to rest was that of enumerated
powers. Its founders desired it to deal with a definitely limited
group of subjects and no others. They cannot therefore reason-
ably be presumed to have intended to confer upon Congress, under
the guise of the power to lay taxes, the power to deal with any
problem of social or economic policy which might be indirectly
affected or controlled by an ingenious use of the taxing power.
Had they so intended, they would have swept away by this one
specific grant of power most of those limitations upon the scope
of federal authority which it was the purpose of the other spe-
words, "for the payment of the debts and necessary expenses of the
United States." Ibid, II, 366. Among the records of the Committee of
Detail was found a proposal in Randolph's writing that Congress should
have power "To raise money by taxation, unlimited as to sum, for the
past or future debts and necessities of the union." Ibid, II, 142.
On Aug. 25 a motion was lost to add to the clause granting Congress
the power to tax the clause "for the payment of said debts and for the
defraying the expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense
and general welfare." Ibid, II, 408.
34The Federalist discusses the federal taxing power at length. See
Nos. 30-36 inc. It nowhere suggests that the power could be used for
purposes other than revenue.
Sherman and Ellsworth in transmitting a copy of the new constitution
to the governor of Connecticut, Sept. 26, 1787, wrote: "The objects for
which Congress may apply monies, are the same mentioned in the eighth
article of the confederation, viz. for the common defense and general wel-
fare, and for the payment of the debts incurred for those purposes."
Farrand, op. cit., III, 99.
McHenry, member of the Convention of 1787 from Maryland, speaking
on Nov. 29 before the Maryland House of Delegates, declared: "The
power given to Congress to lay taxes contains nothing more than is com-
prehended in the spirit of the eighth article of the Confederation." Ibid,
iii, 149.
" Art. VIII of the Articles of Confederation had provided that "All
charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the
common cause or general welfare . . . shall be defrayed out of a
common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in pro-
portion to the value of all such land within each State, etc. . . ." It
was the method of raising money, rather than the purposes of taxation
which the framers of the Constitution sought to change.
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cific grants of power to build up.3 And secondly, had the fram-
ers of the constitution desired to have Congress enjoy that gen-
erous police power which it has been urged it may exercise
through the medium of taxation, is it probable that they would
have limited Congress in the exercise of that police power to
the inconvenient and indirect agency of taxation? Would they
not rather have allowed a reasonable choice of method instead
of saying, in effect, "you may exercise a police power, provided
only you do it under the guise of taxation ?-17
3. Finally, in every case in which the Supreme Court of the
United States has been willing to recognize that Congress has
levied taxes for purposes other than revenue, it has looked upon
these taxes not as exercises by Congress of its granted power to
tax, but as means employed for carrying out other delegated
congressional powers. And this view has been shared by dis-
tinguished legal commentators. In other words, the cases com-
monly cited to prove that the delegated power of taxation may
be used for purposes of regulation and destruction prove nothing
more in fact than that the power of Congress to lay taxes may
be an implied power derived from other congressional powers, or
that Congress may lay taxes as a necessary and proper means of
carrying out its other granted powers.
This is, in the first place, the constitutional justification of
the prohibitive tariff. While there is no decision of the Supreme
Court squarely upon this point, the weight of authority leans to
the view that a prohibitive tariff is not an exercise of the taxing
power at all, but should rather be classified as a regulation of
commerce. 30 In cases where a tariff is levied not only to raise
36Tucker writes: "It is surprising how this sophistical device has
been upheld by learned commentators, for it is obvious that, by such con-
struction of the Constitution, Congress may range with no limit but its
discretion through the realms of reserved and ungranted powers by means
of a clause to tax ad libitum and appropriate at will the money of the
people to the promotion of anything through other agencies than its own
and to the accomplishment of anything it may deem to be for the com-
mon defense and general welfare; for this, in effect, is worse than if
the words 'to provide for the common defense and general welfare'
were held to grant the unlimited power claimed, as it incites to profuse
expenditure and excessive taxation as the only avenue to the unlimited
usurpation of ungranted powers." Op. cit., I, 484. See also Bruce, op.
cit., 3 MINNESOTA LAw REvs v 101-103.37 Waite, op. cit., 6 Mich. Law Review 285.
38 The authority most frequently cited is Cooley who writes: "Consti-
tutionally a tax can have no other basis than the raising of a revenue for
public purposes, and whatever governmental exaction has not this basis is
tyrannical and unlawful. A tax on imports, therefore, the purpose of
which is, not to raise a revenue, but to discourage and indirectly prohibit
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revenue but also for the protection of home industry, it may be
regarded as an exercise of both the taxing and the commerce
powers.39 Even Story, who repudiates the doctrine of taxation
for revenue only, regards the protective tariff as a means of
regulating foreign commerce ;40 and his view would probably be
followed by any court before which the issue could be raised.
In the second place, Congress has laid destructive taxes as a
means of regulating the currency. In 1866, shortly after the es-
tablishment of the national banking system, Congress laid a pro-
hibitive tax of ten per cent upon state bank notes in order to pro-
tect the notes of the new national banks from their competition.4 '
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the constitu-
tionality of this tax in the case of Veasie Bank vs. Fenno, de-
cided in 1869:11 Counsel for the bank urged upon the court that
the tax was invalid because it was so excessive as to indicate a
purpose on the part of Congress to destroy the thing taxed rather
than to raise revenue. The court replied:
"The first answer to this is that the judicial cannot prescribe
to the legislative department of the government limitations upon
the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may
be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility
of the legislature is not to the courts but to the people by whom
its members are elected. So if. a particular tax bears heavily
upon a corporation, or a class of corporations, it cannot, for that
reason only, be pronounced contrary to the constitution."
some particular import for the benefit of some home manufacture, may
well be questioned as being merely colorable, and therefore not warranted
by constitutional principles. But if any income is derived from the levy-
the fact that incidental protection is given to home industry can be no
objection to it, for all taxes must be laid with some regard to their effect
upon the prosperity of the people and the welfare of the country, and
their validity cannot be determined by the money returns. . . . And
perhaps even prohibitory duties may be defended as a regulation of com-
mercial intercourse." Principles of Constitutional Law, 3d Ed., 58. See
also Hall, Constitutional Law, 181; Watson on Constitution, I, 485 n. s.;
Willoughby, op. cit., I, 607. See contra Pomeroy's statement: "A pro-
tective tariff is certainly not indispensable to the execution of the power
to lay taxes; but it is so certainly one of the methods of exercising that
power." Constitutional Law, 217.
9 "The protective tariff laws are measures properly enacted under
the express power to raise revenue and to regulate foreign commerce."
McClain, op. cit., 88.
40 Op. cit., Secs. 1084-1094. But note that Story also regards it as
proper to base protective tariffs on the taxing clause, ibid, Secs. 962-965.
He says, however, that the commerce power is the one from which the
right to enact such tariffs "is more usually derived." Ibid, Sec. 763.
41 Act of July 13, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 146.
4' (1869) 8 Wall. (U. S.) 533, 19 L. Ed. 482.
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It then went on to say that:
"Under the constitution the power to provide a circulation
of coin is given to Congress. . . . Having thus, in the exer-
cise of undisputed constitutional powers, undertaken to provide
a currency for the whole country, it cannot be questioned that
Congress may, constitutionally, secure the benefit of it to the
people by appropriate legislation. To this end, Congress has
denied the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, and has pro-
vided by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin
on the community. To the same end, Congress may restrain,
by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not
issued under its own authority. Without this power, indeed, its
attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the country
must be futile. Viewed in this light, as well as in the other light
of a duty on contracts or property, we cannot doubt the consti-
tutionality of the tax under consideration."
The first of the paragraphs quoted has frequently been cited
as authority for the statement that Congress can tax to an un-
limited degree for any purpose it chooses, irrespective of reve-
nue and without fear of judicial interference.4 3 While it is hard
to see in the passage much more than a statement of the perfectly
obvious doctrine that a tax, otherwise legal, cannot be held
void because a court thinks it is too high, it must be admitted
that it does indicate an opinion on the part of the court that the
power which is being exercised is the taxing power. Since the
power is quite obviously not being employed to raise revenue,
such a view conflicts with the theory of taxation for revenue
only which now is under consideration. But whatever comfort
those who contend for a federal police power through taxation
may derive from this statement will be minimized if not de-
stroyed by the second of the paragraphs quoted, wherein it is
plainly stated that this destructive tax is merely a convenient
method of protecting the national currency. As a matter of
fact, the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions 44 as well as
43 This is apparent from a scrutiny of the debates in Congress upon
any of the regulatory or destructive taxes which have been passed. See
infra, p. 266.
44 Miller, J. in The Head Money Cases said: "In the case of Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, the enormous tax of eight per cent [it was in fact ten
per cent] per annum on the circulation of state banks, which was de-
signed, and did have the effect to drive all such circulation out of ex-
istence, and was upheld because it was a means properly adopted by Con-
gress to protect the currency which it had created; namely the legal ten-
der notes and the notes of the national banks. It was not subject,
therefore, to the rules which would invalidate an ordinary tax pure and
simple." (1884) 112 U. S. 580, 596, 5 S. C. R. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798. In
National Bank v. U. S., (1879) 101 U. S. 1, 6, 25 L. Ed. 979, the court
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numerous text writers" and other authorities" have with prac-
tical unanimity regarded the Veazie Bank case in this light and
leaned to the opinion that the constitutional basis for the levy im-
posed by the act of 1866 was the currency power and not the
taxing power.1
7
In one or two other cases of less importance the Supreme
Court has recognized the distinction between levies made under
the taxing power and those made under other granted powers of
Congress. In the Head Money Cases", involving the validity of
a duty of fifty cents for every alien immigrant brought by vessel
into the United States, the court met such objections to the law
as rested upon its alleged non-conformity to the constitutional re-
quirements regarding federal taxation by declaring that "the true
answer to all these objections is that the power exercised in this
commented on the Act of July 13, 1866, as follows: "The tax is on the
notes paid out, that is, made use of as a circulating medium. Such a
use is against the policy of the United States. Therefore the banker
who helps to keep up the use of paying them out, that is, employing them
as the equivalent of money in discharging his obligations, is taxed for
what he does. The tax was no doubt intended to destroy the use; but
that, as has just been seen, Congress had the power to do." Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 107, 31 S. C. R. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389,
Ann. Cas. 1912B 1312.
4 Hall, op. cit., 311; Hare, op. cit., I. 269; McClain, op. cit., 133;
Willoughby, op. cit., I, 580.
46 Senator Hoar declared in the Senate in 1902 (in discussing the
oleomargarine tax passed in that year), "We had no right to suppress
the state banks in the time of war merely because the wildcat bank was
an evil, it being confined to state business and authorized by state power;
but when we established a national currency we had a right by any
method of constitutional action to protect that national currency against
the competition or rivalry of any other. Therefore we had the right to
tax out of existence the currency of the state banks, just as we should
have had the right to pass a law directly that no state bank should issue
currency in competition with ours." Cong. Rec., Mar. 26, 1902, ,Vol.
35, 3280.
47Those who adhere to the second and third of the three general
views of the scope of the federal taxing power place a different interpre-
tation on the Veazie Bank Case. There is eminent authority holding the
power therein discussed to be the taxing power. See Cooley, Constitu-
tional Limitations, 681, n. 685; Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law,
58; Pomeroy, op. cit., 233. See also dissenting opinion of Holmes, J. in
Hammer v. Dagenhart, (1918) 247 U. S. 251, 277, 62 L. Ed. 1101, 38
S. C. R. 529. Senator Spooner declared in the Senate in 1902 that the
tax of 1866 did not rest on the currency power but that it was upheld
"not because it was required in aid of another power, but because under
the plain language of Sec. 8, it [Congress] had the power to do it."
Cong. Rec., Apr. 1, 1902, Vol. 35, 3506.
48 (1884) 112 U. S. 580, 5 S. C. R. 247, 28 L. Ed. 798. The court used
these words: "If this is an expedient regulation of commerce by Con-
gress, and the end to be attained is one falling within the power, the act
is not void, because, with a loose and more extended sense than was used
in the constitution, it is called a tax." Ibid, p. 596.
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instance'is not the taxing power. The burden imposed on the
ship owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation
of commerce." Thus the requirement that a stamp be placed on
goods intended for export in order to prevent fraud is not levy-
ing a tax even though a charge is made for the stamp.49 But if
the charge is made for purposes of revenue rather than regula-
tion it becomes a tax.5
0
USE OF TAXING POWER NOT FOR REVENUE BUT IN FURTHERANCE
OF DELEGATED CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
The second view of the real scope of the federal taxing
power may be regarded as middle ground between the revenue
only doctrine just discussed and the theory that the power may
be used for general police purposes. This second position ad-
mits the propriety of using the power of taxation for purposes
other than revenue, but not for all such purposes. Its adherents
claim that the grant of taxing power may be exercised for pur-
poses of revenue plus any other purposes lying within the scope
of delegated congressional authority. It has been seen that those
who defend the revenue only theory are under the necessity of
maintaining that when taxes are laid by Congress in order to
regulate commerce or protect the currency, those taxes must be
viewed constitutionally not as expressions of the granted power
of taxation but rather as expressions of the power to regulate
commerce or the currency respectively. The constitutional basis
for such taxes is not the power of taxation at all but the partic-
ular power in aid of which the taxes are laid. Those who hold
the second view, now being analyzed, maintain that taxes laid
in order to help regulate commerce are exercises of the granted
power of taxation and that it is quite proper to employ the taxing
power as a means of supplementing and supporting any other
granted power of Congress. Having thus admitted that the power
of taxation itself, not as an implied power but as a granted power,
may be used for purposes other than the raising of revenue, it is
necessary to defend the position that there are still definite lim-
its upon its scope. It is necessary to show why, from a consti-
tutional viewpoint, the power of taxation may be used to regulate
commerce or the national currency but not to regulate such mat-
49 Pace v. Burgess, (1875) 92 U. S. 372, 23 L. Ed. 657.
5o Almy v. California, (1860) 24 How. (U. S.) 169, 16 L. Ed. 655.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ters as child labor, lotteries, 51 or political campaign contri-
butions.52
The argument in support of this position may be summarized
as follows: The powers of Congress are enumerated and delegat-
ed. The grants of power to Congress taken together were clearly
intended to constitute the sum total not only of the powers confided
to that body but also of the legislative objects about which or in
furtherance of which Congress might exercise those powers. In
short, the various delegations of power must be regarded not
merely as legislative instruments placed in the hands of Congress
to be used for any or all purposes; they must be regarded also
as the ends, objects, or purposes for which Congress may exercise
legislative power. This, it is stated, is what Marshall had in
mind when he said, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, etc. . . . are constitutional ;" and when in the same
case, he declared, "Should Congress, under the pretext of exe-
cuting its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects
not entrusted to the government, it would become the painful duty
of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come
before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land."5
It follows, therefore, that when Congress attempts, through the
51 A destructive tax on lotteries was urged upon Congress with great
vigor. See remarks of Senator White (now Chief Justice) of Louisiana
upon the propriety of this legislation: "When my people were clamoring
for its suppression and crowding upon me petitions to introduce a bill
suppressing the Louisiana Lottery by the exercise of the power of fed-
eral taxation, I said to them, 'Great as is this evil, there is an evil yetgreater, and that is the disruption and the destruction of all the greatprinciples of our government by calling upon the Federal Government to
do an illegal and unconstitutional thing. . . .' I declined to introduce
a bill taxing the Louisiana Lottery by the Federal Government because
I thought it violated the Federal Constitution." Cong. Rec., July 21,1892, Vol. 23, 6519. Such bills were, however, introduced. Compare with
this the view of Judge Cooley, set forth in an article advocating such a
tax, infra, note 81.
52 Senator Thomas (Col.) introduced an amendment to the war rev-
enue bill of 1919, providing for a tax of 100% on any campaign contri-bution in excess of $500 in any primary or election campaign for the
nomination or election of presidential electors, senators, or members
of the House. Cong. Rec., Oct. 10, 1918, Vol. 56, 11169. The amendment
was defeated.
53 McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 421, 4 L.
Ed. 579.
54 Ibid, p. 423. For an analysis of this argument see Tucker, op. cit.,
I; Green, The Child Labor Law and the Constitution, Ill. Law Bull., April,1917, 16. Compare Marshall's statement, "Congress is not empowered
to tax for purposes which are within the exclusive province of the state."
Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheat. 1, 199. 6 L. Ed. 23.See also Kent, Commentaries, 13th Ed. I 279.
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instrumentality of a granted power such as that of taxation, to
regulate or control a subject matter nowhere confided to its au-
thority by virtue of any delegation of power, such as the subject
of child labor, it has exceeded its powers, usurped the reserved
authority of the states, and violated the tenth amendment.
55
This same doctrine may be put in slightly different form by
saying that in exercising the powers delegated to it by the consti-
tution Congress must be regarded as exercising them under the
implied limitation that they shall be employed only for the ob-
jects or ends confided by the constitution to congressional author-
ity. The taxing power has long since been held subject to two
other implied limitations, the binding force of which there is
no disposition to question: one is the limitation of public purpose
in respect to the use of the money raised by taxation ;56 the other
is the limitation implied from the essential nature of our federal
55 This doctrine has been accepted by the supreme court of the Com-
monwealth of Australia. In King v. Barger, (1908) 6 Com. L. R. 41, a
federal tax on articles manufactured in the states, dependent upon the
rate of wages paid and designed to control such wage rate, was held
to be invalid on the ground that the federal government had no authority
to control wages in the states. The following excerpts indicate the main
features of the reasoning of the court:
Higgins, J., "This act is not a taxing act. This is quite a novel form
of legislation, and, if held to be valid, will give to the Commonwealth
Parliament complete control over everything which was intended to be
reserved to the states. Under the guise of a taxing act with exemptions,
the Commonwealth Parliament could control the whole of the business
and social relations of the people of the Commonwealth, and the pro-
visions of the constitution, intended to reserve to the states the right of
managing their internal affairs, would be worthless. (P. 47) . . .
The Commonwealth Parliament can tax any person and any thing; and
it can divide persons and things into classes for the purpose of taxation.
But the moment the particular discrimen for distinguishing between one
class and another in itself involves a regulation of conduct which is
within the exclusive power of the state legislature, the Commonwealth
legislation is invalid." (P. 52.)
Isaacs, C. J., "The power of taxation granted to the Commonwealth
Parliament does not authorize the impairment of the power reserved to
the states to regulate wages." (P. 49.) Par. 107 Ch. V of the Corn-
monvealth of Australia Constitution Act reads: "Every power of the
Parliament of a colony which has become or becomes a state, shall, un-
less it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the
Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the state, con-
tinue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admis-
sion or establishment of the state, as the case may be."
Compare also the last clause in the following sentence from the
Veazie Bank case, supra: "It would undoubtedly be an abuse of the power
[of taxation] if so exercised as to impair the separate existence and
independent self government of the states, or if exercised for ends in-
consistent with the limited grants of power in the constitution." P. 451.
See Tucker, op. cit., I, 373.
56Loan Association v. Topeka, (1875) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 655, L. Ed.
455. This case involved the taxing power of the states but the principles
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system which forbids Congress to tax the governments, agencies,
or functions of the state.5" It is urged that the taxation by Con-
gress of the salary of a state judge is no more subversive of the
fundamental principles of our constitutional system than the
use by Congress of its taxing power to destroy child labor within
the states." For to what purpose did the framers of the consti-
tution reserve certain subjects to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the states if Congress, under the guise of an exercise of the
power to tax, may step in and control those subjects? To admit
the power to tax on the part of Congress for any and all pur-
poses would "abrogate and destroy every limitation found in the
constitution and every reservation in favor of the states." 9
It is interesting to note that the present Chief Justice of the
United States seems to share the view now under consideration.
Mr. White was United States senator from Louisiana at the time
a destructive tax upon cotton and grain futures was being de-
bated in Congress in 1892.60 At that time he expressed himself
vigorously and at length upon the constitutionality of the pro-
posed tax, taking the position that such "subterfugeous and cheat-
ing" use of the taxing power was clearly outside the constitu-
tional authority of Congress. He took occasion in the course of
his argument to draw the distinction between the use of regu-
latory or destructive taxation in aid of the exercise of delegated
congressional power and its use for purposes not so delegated.
"In other words, I contend," he declared, "that where power
to destroy exists, the use of a wrong instrumentality to do the
destruction, may be the abuse of an instrumentality but not an
abuse of power, because the power to destroy is vested. But
where the power to destroy does not exist, the use of an instru-
mentality to destroy that which there is no power to destroy is
involved are applicable with equal force to the federal taxing power. It
should be noted that the limitation of public purpose does not rest on
the due process of law clause as has been sometimes assumed.5 Collector v. Day, (1871) 11 Wall (U. S.) 113, 20 L. Ed. 122; Fifield
v. Close, (1867) 15 Mich. 505.
58 "The principle is equally applicable to a case where the court can seethat a power of government is called into play not for its professed
object but solely for the purpose of defeating rights that cannot be de-
stroyed consistently with any other of the principles upon which the con-
stitution rests, but there is no principle more fundamental than the prin-
ciple in fulfillment of which the national government was created of
circumscribed powers, each conferred for the accomplishment of a speci-fied object, purpose or end." Green, op. cit., Ill. Law Bull., April, 1917, 26.59 Remarks of Senator White, Cong. Rec., July 21, 1892, Vol. 23, 6516.60 The question of the constitutionality of this bill was discussed at
great length. Senator White's long speech against the bill is found inCong. Rec., July 21, 1892, Vol. 23, 6513-6520. The bill was defeated.
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not alone an abuse of the instrumentality but a usurpation of
power itself."61
And in commenting upon the Veazie Bank case, he went on
to state that according to that decision the destructive tax on
state bank notes could be regarded as either a prohibition or a tax.
If it be viewed as a prohibition, then it is merely an exercise of
the admitted power of Congress over the currency. If it be
viewed as a tax, it is not unconstitutional, "because Congress had
the power to use the taxing power to prohibit that which it had
the right to prohibit under another provision of the constitution."
But he was emphatic in his belief that this affords no precedent
for the use of the power to tax for purposes not confided to con-
gressional authority.
62
DESTRUCTIVE OR REGULATORY TAXATION FOR POLICE PURPOSES
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF DELEGATED CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
It is clear that-Congress has not acceded to either of the views
thus far presented. It has regarded the purposes for which it may
use its power to tax as limited neither to the raising of revenue nor
to the furtherance of objects within its delegated authority. It has
legislated more than once upon the theory that the power to tax
is available as a means or instrument for accomplishing any pur-
pose which will further the national welfare and that Congress
may regulate or destroy by taxation things over which it plainly
has no direct authority. Such legislation may be briefly reviewed.
1. Instances of Federal Taxation for General Police Pur-
poses. 3 In 1886 it was proposed to levy an excise tax of ten
cents per pound upon all oleomargarine manufactured in the
61 Ibid, 6517.
62 Ibid, 6517. He further pointed out that the power to lay a pro-
hibitive tariff did not furnish a precedent for the tax under discussion.
To argue that it does, "overlooks the clear distinction between the nature
of the taxing power lodged in the federal government for the purpose of
imposts and the nature of the taxing power lodged in the federal gov-
ernment for the purpose of internal taxation. . . . When the federal
government deals with imposts the constitution has vested in it the power
which would be vested in any government in that regard. . . . No
power as to imposts was reserved in the states by the federal constitution.
All the lawful powers of government which could be exercised in that
particular passed into the life and being of the federal government by
the lodgment in that government of the power to levy imposts-imposts
deal externally beyond our borders. Beyond those borders the power of
the federal government was restricted and restrained by no limitation
resulting from a reservation in the constitution." Ibid, 6516.
63 No attempt has here been made to search out all the cases in which
Congress has laid taxes for purposes of regulation. Only those are here
treated regarding which there has been sharp controversy on the point
of constitutionality.
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United States. After considerable debate in both houses of
Congress, the tax was reduced to two cents per pound, a rate
so low as to preclude the tax from being classed as destructive
in character.64 In 1902, however, a tax of ten cents per pound
was placed upon all oleomargarine colored to look like butter ;"
and this tax has accomplished the purpose for which it was ad-
mittedly imposed, the destruction of the business of manufac-
turing colored oleomargarine. In 1892 it was proposed in Con-
gress to place a license tax of $1000 upon all brokers or dealers
engaged in the selling of cotton or grain on future contracts or
options and a tax of five cents per pound or twenty cents per
bushel upon all products so sold.66 This tax did not become law,
but in 1914 Congress did impose a tax of two cents per pound upon
all cotton sold on future contracts.6 7  In 1890 a tax of ten dollars
was imposed upon the sale of smoking opium.6 In 1914 this tax
was raised to $300 per pound.69 In 1912 Congress drove out of
existence the manufacture of matches made from poisonous phos-
phorus by subjecting these matches to the crushing tax of two
cents per hundred.70  Finally, as has been already stated, Con-
gress has placed a tax of ten per cent upon the net profits of es-
tablishments employing children. 71
An examination of the congressional debates on these mea-
sures makes perfectly clear that Congress was not trying to
raise revenue but was trying to exercise police power in matters
outside the scope of its delegated authority. The oleomargarine
taxes were openly defended upon the ground that the legitimate
dairy interests of the country must be protected against the de-
structive competition of a product alleged to be not only inferior
but positively dangerous to health. 72 The taxes on options or sales
on future contracts were urged as necessary restraints on com-
64 Act of Aug. 2, 1886, 24 Stat. at L. 209.
65 Act of 1902, 32 Stat. at L. 193.
66 The text of this proposed measure is printed in the Cong. Rec.
July 21, 1892, Vol. 23, 6514.67 Act of Aug. 18, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 693. This was declared uncon-
stitutional by a United States district court because, being a revenue
measure, it originated in the Senate rather than in the House of Repre-
sentatives as required by art. 1, sec. 7, cl. 1 of the constitution. Hubbard v.
Lowe, (1915) 226 Fed. 135. It was re-enacted as Act of Aug. 11, 1916,
39 Stat. at L. 476.68 Act of Oct. 1, 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 5670.
69 Act of Jan. 17, 1914, 38 Stat. at L. 277.
70 Act of April 9, 1912, 37 Stat. at L. 81. The constitutionality of this
act has never been passed upon by any court.
71 Supra, note 10.
72 See debates on H. R. 9206, Index to Cong. Rec., Vol. 35.
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mercial gambling.73 When the tax on white phosphorus matches
was being discussed in the Senate in 1912, Senator Lodge, who
was sponsoring the bill, declared without hesitation, "The real
purpose of the bill is to destroy an industry that ought to be
destroyed. 7 4  He was equally frank as to the purpose of the
recent child labor tax, as were most of the other friends of the
bill.7" In fact, the debates on this measure show that the Senate
Committee on Finance, in estimating the revenue expected from
the various taxes included in the Revenue Act of 1919, placed
no estimate opposite the child labor tax, indicating that they did
not expect any revenue to flow from it into a sadly depleted
treasury.
76
2. Argument in Snpport of This Theory. In order to show
that Congress enjoys the broad power of taxation for police pur-
poses it is necessary at the outset to dispose of the revenue only
theory already discussed. 77  There are two steps in this process
of refutation. It is pointed out, first, that the power of taxation
granted to Congress is no different in character and no more
limited, save as to the specific requirements of apportionment
and uniformity and the specific prohibition against export taxes,
than is the power of taxation possessed by the. states of the
union or by any other sovereign government. As Senator Ed-
munds expressed it in the debate on the oleomargarine tax stat-
ute of 1886, "the taxing power of the United States is just as
extensive, just as supreme, just as illimitable as the taxing power
of every state is." s78  Gray states this position even more strik-
ingly in the following passage commenting upon the intentions
of the framers of the federal constitution:
73 See debates on Senate bill 110; Index to Cong. Rec., Vol. 51.
74 Cong. Rec., April 3, 1912, Vol. 4235. In regard to the same bill
Mr. Longworth (Ohio) declared in the House, "It is the purpose of the
bill to destroy it [the poisonous match industry] and that is the reason
I am for the bill, because I want it stamped out." Ibid, 3973.
75 Supra, notes 4 and 12.
76 In response to a question on this point, Senator Simmons, chair-
man of the Committee on Finance, stated: "I can only say to the Senator
that I do not think there was an estimate made as to the amount of rev-
enue that would be raised by it . . . and I do not think any one
suggested that any would be derived." Cong. Rec., Vol. 57, 612. It is
interesting to compare this with the argument of Mr. Miller Outcalt
for the plaintiff in error in the McCray case: "It is not out of place to ad-
vert to an overflowing treasury, and the expediency which this same Con-
gress felt in reducing the revenue derived under the Spanish War Acts,
in this same year, by an amount equal to $70,000,000. The law was avow-
edly not a revenue measure but a police regulation." 43 L. Ed. 78, 80.
77 Supra, p. 251.
78 Cong. Rec., July 19, 1886, Vol. 17, 7139.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"The example of a strong general government which they had
in mind, and the only one with which most of them were familiar,
was the government of Great Britain. The powers of that gov-
ernment were well known to them, its machinery had been cop-
ied in most of the states. In view of these facts it may be gen-
erally stated that in their bestowal of powers on the general gov-
ernment and in their restriction of those powers (particularly of
taxing powers, since dispute as to taxation was one of the chief
causes of the Revolution) they intended:
"1. To grant to the general government those powers usually
exercised by the government of Great Britain, and in matters of
taxation to grant the same general authority of classification and
selection as was possessed by the British government and by the
state governments modeled upon it.
"2. To restrict those powers thus granted in such a way as
to prevent discrimination among the states. '7 9
In short, unless state governments and the governments of
sovereign nations generally at the time of the formation of our
national government were limited in the use of their taxing pow-
ers to the raising of revenue, there is no reason to assume that
the taxing power granted Congress was so limited.
This raises the question, in the second place, whether the
power of taxation enjoyed by sovereign governments at this
period was thus limited to the raising of revenue. On this
point there can be no clearer or more definite statement than
that of Story's:
"Nothing is more clear, from the history of commercial na-
tions, than the fact that the taxing power is often, very often
applied for other purposes than revenue. It is often applied as
a regulation of commerce. It is often applied as a virtual pro-
hibition upon the importation of particular articles, for the en-
couragement and protection of domestic products, and industry;
for the support of agriculture, commerce and manufactures, for
retaliation upon foreign monopolies and injurious restrictions;
for purposes of state policy and domestic economy; sometimes
to banish a noxious article of consumption; sometimes, as a
bounty upon an infant manufacture, or agricultural product;
sometimes, as a temporary restraint of trade; sometimes, as a
suppression of particular employments; sometimes, as a prerog-
ative power to destroy competition and secure a monopoly to
the government.
"If, then, the power to lay taxes, being general, may embrace,
and in the practice of nations does embrace, all these objects,
either separately or in combination, upon what foundation does
the argument rest which assumes one object only, to the exclu-
79 Limitations of the Taxing Power, p. 350.
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sion of all the rest, which insists, in effect, that because revenue
may be one object, therefore it is the sole object of the
power . . . ?0
Among the eminent authorities who have agreed with this
view may be mentioned Judge Cooley, who, in 1892, in urging
Congress to place a destructive tax on lotteries, declared, "Rev-
enue is not and has never been the sole object of taxation."'i
In the third place, it should be noted that the constitutional
clause granting the power of taxation seems to repudiate the
revenue only doctrine. By the plain words of that clause, Con-
gress enjoys the power to "lay taxes, to pay the public debts
and provide for the common defense and general welfare." Now,
as Story pertinently inquires:
"If the common defense or general welfare can be promoted
by laying taxes in any other manner than for revenue, who is
at liberty to say that Congress cannot constitutionally exercise
the power for such a purpose? No one has a right to say that
the common defense and general welfare can never be promoted
by laying taxes, except for revenue. No one has ever yet been
bold enough to assert such a proposition.
' s2
That Hamilton placed a similar broad construction upon this
clause is evidenced by the fact that he defended the constitu-
tionality of the protective tariff as an exercise of the congres-
80 Commentaries, Sec. I, 965, 966. For analysis in this respect of
the taxes imposed by England to which the American colonists took
exception see Farrand, The Development of the United States, p. 37.
Farrand quotes Madison's statement made after the Revolution, that "The
line of distinction between the power of regulating trade and that of
drawing revenue from it, which was once considered the barrier of our
liberties, was found, on fair discussion, to be absolutely undefinable."
Ibid, 38. See also Story, op. cit., II, Sec. 1080. For careful argument
from the standpoint of economics that taxes laid for purposes of regu-
lation and destruction should be subsumed under the power of taxation
and not under the police power, see Seligman, Essays in Taxation, pp.
402-406, 411-413.
81Federal Taxation of Lotteries, (1892) Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 69,
523. Supplementing the phrase quoted in the text, Judge Cooley adds that
the lawmaker "must not aim to make his law as productive as possible,
but rather to make the demand upon the people as little burdensome as
may be, and at the same time, as far as possible, incidentally beneficial."
Commenting further upon the proposed tax he says: "Such taxation
would of course, contemplate no revenue to the government. It would
be imposed for the express purpose of destroying altogether the institu-
tions which, by any unfriendly action of Congress, taken with the express
intent of destruction and shaped professedly to that end, it would be
powerless to reach. It would, in other words, be making a practical
application by the federal government of the legal aphorism that 'a power
to tax is a power to destroy.' Ibid, p. 526. Arguments for and against
the tax are discussed in the article. Compare with the statement of same
writer in his work on Taxation, 3d Ed. I, 191.
82 Commentaries, I.
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sional taxing power for the purpose of providing for "the com-
mon defense and general welfare."' 3
After dealing thus with the revenue only theory of the fed-
eral taxing power, the friends of the child labor tax and similar
legislation, in order to establish their case, must still demolish
the proposition that Congress may use its power of taxation for
only such purposes as fall within the scope of the other dele-
gated powers of Congress."- The argument on this point may
be summarized thus: In the first place, while Congress enjoys
only delegated powers, those powers, save when limited by an
express restriction or prohibition, are plenary and complete.
This is elementary constitutional law.8 5 "Except when expressly
limited, . . . a power granted to the federal government is con-
strued to be absolute in character."8 This means that apart
from these specific exceptions Congress has the same power to
lay taxes or to regulate commerce as is possessed by the British
Parliament or any other sovereign government in the world.
7
Its granted powers do not shrink or melt away by the insidious
working of implied restrictions or reservations. Secondly, it
must be remembered that what section 8 of article I of the con-
stitution grants to Congress is "power." Nothing is said about
the purposes for which the various grants of power there dele-
gated are to be used. The grant stands as an independent and
self-sufficient delegation of authority. Congress is not given
a list of topics about which it is to be allowed to pass laws; nor
is it given merely a set of legislative tools or methods to be used
in doing a certain limited group of assigned tasks and in the
use of which, to borrow Professor Powell's apt phrase, Congress
"suffers the limitations of the player at jackstraws,"' s fearful
83 Report on Manufactures, Dec. 5, 1791. Works, Lodge Ed., Vol.
IV, 151. It should be noted, however, that Hamilton's argument did
not proceed on the assumption that no revenue would be raised by the
protective tariffs proposed.
84 Supra, p. 261.
85 "But it must not be forgotten that when the constitution was
adopted there came into existence a nation (as distinguished from a
league of states) which possessed absolute and unlimited inherent pow-
ers." Black, op. cit., 35; Hall, op. cit., 255; Hare, op. cit., 94; McClain,
op. cit., 43; Pomeroy, op. cit., 70. McCulloch v. Maryland, supra, p.
'05; United States v. Cruikshank, (1876) 92 U. S. 542, 550, 23 L. Ed. 588.
86 Willoughby, op. cit., I, 54.
87 Supra, p. 268. Story, op. cit., II, 1081.
88 The Child Labor Decision, The Nation, June 22, 1918, Vol. 106,
p. 730.
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always of trespassing on the domain of state authority.8 9 It is
given the power to lay taxes and to coin money and to regulate
commerce and these powers are to be used in the broad discre-
tion of Congress for the promotion of the national welfare
Finally, by very definition it is utterly impossible for the reserved
powers of the states to operate as a limitation upon the scope or
method of operation of the powers delegated to Congress by the
constitution. Such a conception involves a flat contradiction in
terms. What are the reserved powers of the states but the pow-
ers left after the powers of Congress have been delegated?9o
Curious indeed would be the arithmetical process of subtraction
in which the remainder, somewhat rendered inviolable in advance,
helped determine the size of the subtrahend. And yet precisely
this absurdity is involved in the theory that the reserved powers
of the states have become transformed into a sort of ark of the
covenant which Congress in the exercise of its granted authority
must not touch. If a power is delegated to Congress, then by
virtue of that very fact there can be no reserved power of the
states with which it could in any way or under any circum-
stances conflict.0 1
If Congress is not limited in using its power to tax to the
raising of revenue or to such purposes as may be subsumed
under the grants of power in article I, it follows that that power
may be wielded generously in any way which will promote the
common defense and general welfare. It may stimulate industry;
it may regulate the size of incomes or private fortunes; it may
89"The question then is narrowed to whether the exercise of its
otherwise constitutional power by Congress can be pronounced un-
constitutional because of its possible reaction upon the conduct of the
states in a matter upon which I have admitted that they are free from
direct control. I should have thought that that matter had been disposed
of so fully as to leave no room for doubt. I should have thought that
the most conspicuous decisions of this Court had made it clear that the
power to regulate commerce and other constitutional powers could not be
cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with the carrying
out of the domestic policy of any state." Dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes, Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra.
90 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively,
or to the people." Constitution of U. S., Amendment X.
9
'Compare Professor Powell's argument on this point in respect to
the Keating-Owen Act: "If the child labor law was a proper exercise of
the power to regulate interstate commerce, it was by the explicit terms
of the tenth amendment not an exercise of a power reserved to the
states. If it was not a proper exercise of the power to regulate interstate
commerce, it was unconstitutional, and nothing more need be said about
it." The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce
Clause, (1918) 3 So. Law Quar. 175.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
suppress vice or other conditions fraught with menace to the
people. In short, questions which may arise regarding the pur-
poses for which Congress uses its power of taxation are ques-
tions solely of legislative policy and not in any sense questions
of constitutional law. 2
The right to use the taxing power for these broad purposes
would not, even in the judgment of its advocates, warrant its
exercise in such a way as to destroy fundamental private rights.
Should Congress impose a tax of a thousand dollars upon all
persons who ate bread or were members of the Roman Catholic
Church, the court would of necessity decide that such an exercise
of the power to tax was an invasion of the rights which are,
in any free government, inviolable."5 Such a limitation would
dearly be in line with the theory upon which the Supreme Court
has held that taxes may be levied only for a public purpose.
9 4
But these limitations in behalf of the fundamental rights of the
citizen would not interfere with the use of the congressional
taxing power for any purposes related to the common defense
and general welfare of the nation.
THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY
Thus far the purposes for which Congress may use its power
to tax have been considered in the light of general constitutional
92 After adverting to the implied restriction that Congress may not
tax The states or their instrumentalities, Cooley states: "With the excep-
tion of cases resting on like or kindred reasons to those suggested, the
protection as against the abuse of the federal power to tax must be
looked for in the good sense of the representatives of the people, and in
keeping alive the feeling that for all improper legislation they may be
held to strict accountability by their constituents." Op. cit., Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. 69, 534. "In selecting objects of taxation we have a right
to keep in mind, as every Congress has kept in mind, the general welfare
of the people of the United States. The object of taxation is revenue.
The motive with which, for one, I vote to select this particular article for
taxation is the interest, as I understand it, of the people." Speech of
Senator Spooner on Oleomargarine Tax of 1902, Cong. Rec., April
1, 1902, Vol. 35, 3506.
93"Let us concede that if a case was presented where the abuse of
the taxing power was so extreme as to be beyond the principles which
we have previously stated, and where it was plain to the judicial mind
that the power had been called into play, not for revenue, but solely for
the purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed
consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon which the
constitution rests, that it would be the duty of the courts to say that
such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of a delegated power, but
was the exercise of an authority not conferred." White, C. J. in McCray
v. U. S. (1904) 195 U. S. 27, 64, 24 S. C. R. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78, 1 Ann.
Cas. 561.94Loan Association v. Topeka, supra.
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principles. The questions discussed here have been those which
each member of Congress must settle in his own mind before vot-
ing for a taxing bill regarding which these controversies might
arise, since he is bound by his oath of office to s.upport the consti-
tution. They have all been concerned with the broad issue: Is the
use of the taxing power for general police purposes defensible on
sound constitutional principles? They all relate, therefore, to
what has been aptly termed the problem of subjective consti-
tutionality. °5
There remains to be considered what may be called the prob-
lem of objective constitutionality. Assuming for the sake of
argument that the child labor tax or some analogous act violates
sound constitutional principles, can the Supreme Court actually get
hold of that unconstitutionality and declare the tax null and void?
In other words, is the constitutionality of the act of such a na-
ture that the courts can afford judicial relief? For it must be
borne in mind that there are plenty of instances in our constitu-
tional system in which the Supreme Court is powerless to pre-
vent even the flagrant violation of our fundamental law.G Does
the use by Congress of a constitutional power for an unconstitu-
tional purpose create a case in which the remedy for unconstitu-
tional action must be political rather than judicial?
Consideration of this problem may well begin with an exam-
ination of the case of McCray v. United States,17 in which in 1904
the Supreme Court sustained the validity of the oleomargarine
tax of 1902. It was urged upon the court in this case that the
tax of ten cents per pound upon colored oleomargarine was not
designed to raise revenue but to suppress the manufacture of
the article taxed. Everyone knew of course, that this was true.
Such a tax was alleged to be unconstitutional because it amounted
to an invasion of the reserved power of the states, because it was
not in itself a legitimate means of exercising the taxing power,
because of its destructive nature, and because it amounted to a
deprivation of liberty and property rights which no free govern-
ment might destroy.
The opinion of Mr. Justice White in the McCray case de-
clared, first, that the court could not inquire into the motives
95 Infra, p. 275.96These instances are those in which the Court faces what it has
called "political questions." See Black, op. cit., 100, Cooley, Principles,
157, Hall, op. cit., 40, Willoughby, op. cit., II, 999.97(1904) 195 U. S. 27, 24 S. C. R. 769, 49 L. E. 78, 1 Ann. Cas. 561.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
which actuated a particular exercise of an admitted power of
Congress. This is, of course, familiar doctrine.9 s
"No instance is afforded," said the court, "from the founda-
tion of the government where an act which was within a power
conferred, was dclared to be repugnant to the constitution, be-
cause it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular exertion
of constitutional power was either unwise or unjust....
"It is, however, argued if a lawful power may be exerted
for an unlawful purpose, and thus, by abusing the power, it may
be made to accomplish a result not intended by the constitution.
all limitations of power must disappear, and the grave functions
lodged in the judiciary, to confine all the departments within the
authority conferred by the constitution, will be of no avail. This,
when reduced to its last analysis, comes to this: that because
a particular department of the government may exert its lawful
powers with the object or motive of reaching an end not justified,
therefore it becomes the duty of the judiciary to restrain the
exercise of a lawful power wherever it seems to the judicial mind
that such lawful power has been abused. But this reduces itself
to the contention that, under our constitutional system, the abuse
of one department of the government of its lawful powers is to
be corrected by the abuse of its powers by another department."
In the second place, the court refused to invalidate the act
on the ground that the results of the law, irrespective of its form
or the motives of its framers, were such as to indicate an uncon-
stitutional use of the taxing power. The court said:
"Undoubtedly, in determining whether a particular act is
within a granted power, its scope and effect is to be considered.
Applying this rule to the acts assailed, it is self-evident that on
their face they levy an excise tax. That being their necessary
scope and operation, it follows that the acts are within the grant
of power. The argument to the contrary rests on the proposition
that, although the tax be within the power, as enforcing it will
destroy or restrict the manufacture of artificially colored oleo-
margarine, therefore the power to levy the tax did not obtain.
This, however, is but to say that the question of power depends,
not on the authority conferred by the constitution, but upon what
may be the consequence arising from the exercise of the lawful
authority."
The upshot of the McCray case, then, seems to be that the
Supreme Court will not invalidate any congressional act which
"on its face" levies a tax, no matter what the motive or results
98Black, op. cit., 69; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 257; Story,
op. cit., II, sec. 1090; Willoughby, op. cit., I, 18; United States v. Des
Moines Nay. & R. Co., (1891) 142 U. S. 510, 544, 35 L. Ed. 1099, 12 S. C.
R. 308; Weber v. Freed, (1915) 239 U. S. 325, 330, 60 L. Ed. 308, 310, 36
S. C. R. 311, Ann. Cas. 1916C 317; Dakota Cent. Teleph. Co. v. South
Dakota, (1919) 250 U. S. 163, 194. 63 L. Ed. 910, 924, 39 S. C. R. 507.
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of that act may be. This is all that the case actually decided.
The court suggests by way of dictum that there may be attempts
by Congress to exercise the taxing power which are not "on their
face" acts of taxation and which not only amount to "an abuse
of delegated power, but the exercise of an authority not con-
ferred." But it seems clear that what Mr. Justice White had in
mind was the possibility of the use by Congress of its taxing
power for the destruction of fundamental private rights.99
This raises the interesting question, when, if ever, does a law
purporting to be an exercise by Congress of its power to tax
cease to be a tax "on its face," so as to justify the court in de-
claring it null and void.10 0 The answer to this question is not to
be found in Mr. Justice White's opinion in the McCray case,
but some light upon the meaning which he attached to the phrase
"on its face" may be gleaned from a further perusal of his re-
marks in the United States Senate while he was a member of
that body.
In the first place, it is apparent from the statements of Sen-
ator White that a law purporting to be a tax law does not in his
judgment necessarily cease to be a tax "on its face" and thereby
fall under the judicial ban even when as a member of Congress
he would be obliged to vote against the bill as unconstitutional
because he knows the purpose of the tax to be not revenue but
prohibition or regulation.' 0 ' He cannot necessarily know and
act upon as a judge the things which he knows as a legislator.
"It is perfectly self-evident when a bill, which is a revenue
bill, comes to me for consideration, as to whether I will vote for
it or not, it may be to me-if I may be allowed to use the word,
a philosophical word-subjectively unconstitutional per se, and
I may not vote for it as constitutional, because I know that,
although it is a revenue bill, there is a purpose of destruction
and prohibition contained in it. But when it comes to the court,
the court can only look at it objectively. The court must look
at its provisions, and if on its face it is a revenue bill, if on its
face it be for the purpose of raising revenue, the court will say
that it cannot consider the motive, but must decree its enforce-
ment. ...
90For the full context see note 93, supra.
lOoIt is interesting to note that Cooley also uses this phrase "on its
face" in discussing the validity of taxing acts. He says: "Practically,
therefore, a law purporting to levy taxes, and not being on its face
subject to objection, is unassailable, whatever may have been the real
purpose." Principles of Constitutional Law, p. 58.
loIt is clear, of course, that Senator White adhered to. this narrower
view of the proper purposes of federal taxation. Supra, p. 264.
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"If I were the Executive or a judge and the bill came to me,
then having passed out of this sphere and into another sphere
where motives could not enter, I should say the sole question
presented to me was, does it raise revenue on its face, and if so,
I would hold it constitutional.'
10 2
But in the second place, if a judge is convinced from a study,
not of the congressional debates, but of the provisions of the
taxing measure itself, that it cannot in practical effect raise any
revenue, but must of necessity result in regulation or destruction
of things outside congressional authority, he may then conclude
that it is not a tax law "on its face" and may hold it unconsti-
tutional. This was Senator White's attitude toward the destruc-
tive taxes proposed to be levied upon cotton and grain futures.
He declared that:
"On the very face of the bill not even a pretext of taxation
can be found. By the very terms of the -bill no tax can result
from its provisions ...
"It is perfectly true that in two or three cases the Supreme
Court of the United States has said that where on the face of
a statute there was the exercise of taxation, as the statute was on
its face a taxing statute, the court would not destroy the face
of the statute with the sponge of the motives which may have
actuated the members who passed it. Is that the case here?
Where the face of the statute shows no tax, where the face of
the statute itself eliminates all human possibility of the exercise
of the taxing power for revenue, then I say the mission of juris-
diction is given to the courts of this land to brush that statute
away for its flagrant and open violation of the constitution ...
If the usurpation is clear on the face of the act, if the act itself
shows the usurpation, the power exists in the Supreme Court to
prevent the usurpation."' 0'
In short, when the court concludes from a scrutiny of the act
itself that the act cannot in effect produce revenue, it need not
'
0 2Cong. Rec., July 21, 1892, Vol. 23, 6518-6519.
Compare with this the following statement by President Cleveland in
his message accompanying his approval of the Oleomargarine Tax Act of
1886: "It has been urged as an objection to this measure that while pur-
porting to be legislation for revenue its real purpose is to destroy, by the
use of the taxing power, one industry of our people for the protection
and benefit of another.
"If entitled to indulge in such suspicion as a basis of official action
in this case, and if entirely satisfied that the consequences indicated would
ensue, I should doubtless feel constrained to interpose executive dissent.
"But I do not feel called upon to interpret the motives of Congress
otherwise than by the apparent character of the bill which has been pre-
sented to me, and I am convinced that the taxes which it creates cannot
possibly destroy the open and legitimate manufacture and sale of the
thing upon which it is levied." Richardson, Messages and Papers of the
President, VIII, 427.
loaCong. Rec., July 21, 1892, Vol. 23, 6516.
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hesitate, according to Senator White, to declare that Congress has
tried to wield an authority which it does not possess and that
such an exercise of the taxing power is "objectively" unconsti-
tutional. 04
Senator White's standard for judging the objective consti-
tutionality of a congressional use of the taxing power has much
more than an academic interest, first because his present position
as Chief Justice of the United States gives him an opportunity to
apply it or urge its application in the forthcoming decision on
the validity of the child labor tax, and also because he has already
had one opportunity to apply it, namely, in the McCray case,
and it is therefore possible to observe its nature and limitations.
The fact that the oleomargarine tax of 1902 was under the cir-
cumstances found objectively constitutional throws some light
upon the true value of Senator White's test as a check upon the
use of the federal taxing power for police purposes. In com-
menting in the Senate in 1892 upon the oleomargarine tax of
1886, Senator White declared that when this measure was intro-
duced into Congress it provided for a "prohibitive tax" but that
in spite of the pressure for its passage it was too much for the
"constitutional stomachs" of some of the members and it was
accordingly reduced to a revenue-producing capacity.'05  The im-
plication is perfectly clear that Senator White regarded this
"prohibitive" tax as one which was objectively unconstitutional;
while the tax in its reduced form was objectively constitutional.
Now this objectively unconstitutional tax on oleomargarine was a
tax of ten cents per pound. In 1904, however, when as associate
justice of the Supreme Court, Mr. White wrote the opinion in
104"Now let us reason out the consequences, if it be not true. If this
be not true, then the beautiful system by which, as I said just now, all
the departments of the government move in a common orbit, vanishes
out of the sidereal universe of government and passes into confusion
and chaos. The precedents are against it. The power which the Su-
preme Court of the United States exercises in the review of statutes is
like unto the power exercised by the supreme courts of all the states. The
books are full of cases in the state courts drawing the distinction which
I have made. In the Topeka case it is drawn in plain words by the
Supreme Court of the United States. There a government appropriated
a sum of money, declaring it to be for a public purpose. The case went
to the Supreme Court of the United States and it said your motive and
your purpose cannot be inquired into. That is removed beyond the do-
main of controversy or question. But where you have called the statute
one thing and the very terms of the statute indicate another thing, and
that other thing is outside the powers of government, then it is not a
statute at all, but it is a violation of authority and we strike it from the
statute books." Cong. Rec., July 21, 1897, Vol. 23, 6516.
05Cong. Rec., July 21, 1892, Vol. 23, 6518.
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the McCray case, the same tax of ten cents per pound on colored
oleomargarine seemed to him "on its face" to be a revenue meas-
ure and therefore objectively constitutional. A tax objectively
unconstitutional in 1886 turns out to be objectively constitutional
in 1904.10° One is forced to the conclusion that he found as
justice of the Supreme Court insurmountable difficulties in the
way of declaring "objectively unconstitutional" a taxing statute
which as a legislator he had felt convinced should fall under the
judicial ban.
It is not at all surprising that the Supreme Court, even had
it been unanimously inclined to do so, should have found it
exceedingly difficult to declare unconstitutional a law purporting
to be an exercise by Congress of its delegated power of taxation
because it did not "on its face" levy a tax. In addition to the
general presumption of constitutionality which attaches to any
act of the legislature there is added, unless Congress is unusually
careless, the presumption arising from the legislative label declar-
ing the act to be for the raising of revenue. 0 7 It is necessary also
for the court to give full weight to the unquestioned freedom
of Congress to select the subjects of lawful taxation, 08 and,
having selected them, to impose rates which are restricted only
by legislative discretion. 0 9  The court must also exercise
sufficient self-control to rule out of consideration all that it may
know about the purposes and motives actuating the legislators
responsible for passing the law. ° It is not at liberty to decide
10 GThere is a theory on which the Act of 1886 can be distinguished
from the Act of 1902. The earlier law levied a uniform tax upon all
oleomargarine. The Act of 1902 levied a tax of one-quarter of a cent
per pound on uncolored oleomargarine and a tax of ten cents per pound
on that which was colored. It was argued in Congress that the destruc-
tive tax upon the colored product was to aid the government in the en-
forcement of the revenue-producing tax on the uncolored product by
preventing a deception which would facilitate tax evasion. See remarks
of Senator Hoar, Cong. Rec., Mar. 26, 1902, Vol. 35, 3282, and of Senator
Spooner, ibid 3506. This is the theory upon which the Supreme Court up-
held the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act in the recent case of the United States
v. Doremus, (1919) 249 U. S. 86, 63 L. Ed.-, 39 S. C. R. 214. There is no
evidence, however, that Mr. Justice White attached any significance to this
point when writing his opinion in the McCray case.
107 The entire statute was entitled "An Act to Provide Revenue and
For Other Purposes ;" the section relating to child labor was entitled
"Tax on the Employment of Child Labor."
108 Treat v. White, (1900) 181 U. S. 264, 45 L. Ed. 853, 21 S. C. R.
611; Patton v. Brady, (1902) 184 U. S. 608, 46 L. Ed. 713, 22 S. C. R. 493.
See Cooley, Principles, p. 57; Cooley, Taxation, I, 179-180.
109 Marshall established this doctrine in McCulloch v. Maryland.
Knowlton v. Moore, (1900) 187 U. S. 41, 58, 20 S. C. R. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969.
110 See note 98, supra.
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whether or not "on its face" the act raises revenue by finding out
whether pr not, when set in operation, it actually does raise any
revenue."" Probably in most cases also such evidence would be
lacking at the time the court needed it," 2 and such evidence
might, be of very questionable reliability as a guide to the
court.'13 If the court is able thus to orient itself sufficiently and
to bring to bear on its problem the mental complex which should
result from the considerations above noted, it must then address
itself to the problem whether the provisions of the statute which
it is scrutinizing are, in and of themselves, of such a character
as to leave no reasonable doubt that the act is not an act to raise
revenue. To make this judicial guess as to what the statute was
probably meant to accomplish and what it probably will accom-
plish, the court must deal with factors which are not only highly
speculative in character but have an awkward tendency to fluc-
tuate. Whether an alleged revenue law may be reasonably pre-
sumed to produce revenue will depend upon circumstances, and
circumstances may change. The measure of constitutionality
might thus tend to shift." 4  In short, in applying this test of ob-
jective unconstitutionality, the court will properly feel that it
must be more than usually sure of its ground in respect to a
111 See paragraph quoted from Mr. Justice White's opinion in the
McCray case, note 93 supra.
112 As when the question of the validity of the taxing act is raised in
an action seeking an injunction to restrain enforcement. This was the
nature of the proceeding in the United States district court in which the
child labor tax has been held invalid. Supra, note 11. The court might
be compelled to determine this question before the law had been fairly
put into operation.
123 It is, of course, well known that even fiscal experts are frequently
deceived as to the actual revenue-bearing capacity of a particular tax.
Furthermore, interested parties might secure the payment for a tem-
porary period even of prohibitive taxes in order to provide evidence of
the ability of the tax to produce some revenue.
114 This was pointed out in humorous fashion by Mr. Hepburn in the
debate in the House on the oleomargarine tax of 1886: "In the year
1887, when the effect of the bill, we will suppose, is to prohibit the manu-
facture of oleomargarine, the bill becomes unconstitutional. But sup-
pose the next year on account of the withdrawal of 20,000,000 pounds of
this spurious butter that is sold, and used as butter, leaving on the' market
1,000,000 pounds of good butter, the price of butter is enhanced, going up
to 25c or 30c a pound. The manufacturer of the bogus article can then
compete, if he can make the article and pay the tax, so that there will
be a revenue of $20,000,000 to the government. Then the law becomes a
constitutional measure! So that according to the gentleman's argument
the bill may be constitutional in 1886, unconstitutional in 1887, and again
become constitutional in 1888. The bill is not constitutional or unconsti-
tutional because of the nature of the enactments that it contains, but
because of the price of butter !" (Laughter.) Cong. Rec., Vol. 17, 4901.
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problem so vague and baffling in character that sureness of
ground will frequently be well nigh unattainable.
The writer ventures the opinion that should the majority of
the Supreme Court adopt either the revenue only theory of
federal taxation or Chief Justice White's theory that the purposes
for which Congress may tax are limited by the reserved powers
of the states, it would find the problem of applying any satis-
factory test of objective constitutionality for the purpose of
enforcing such limitations so fraught with difficulties that those
limitations would practically cease to function. Congress would
find itself possessed in reality of practically the same broad pow-
ers of taxation which the states and other sovereign governments
enjoy. Such power would continue to be subject to all the
express limitations found in the constitution; it would be subject
to the implied limitation that the revenue raised must be for a
public purpose; it would be subject to the implied limitation that
it must not burden the governments or functions of the states;
it would be subject to the implied limitation that it must not
infringe the individual rights which under a free government are
inviolable. It seems exceedingly doubtful that any instance will
arise in which a law passed by Congress in exercise of its power
to tax which was safely within all these express and implied
restrictions will be declared null and void by the Supreme Court
because "on its face" it does not "levy a tax." If Senator White's
standard of objective constitutionality failed to function in the
McCray case, it is not easy to imagine the kind of taxing statute
to which it would apply. If it was inapplicable to the oleomar-
garine tax of 1902 it is hard to discover its applicability to the
child labor tax of 1919.
By way of summary and conclusion it may be suggested that
the nature of the purposes for which Congress may properly
use its power to tax is a question on which there is now and
has always been a wide difference of opinion. There is plenty
of respectable authority for the support of each one of the three
views discussed. It may be noted that Congress has proceeded
upon the theory that it may use its power to tax for the accom-
plishment of any purposes which will aid the common defense
and general welfare. It is apparent that the Supreme Court has
never put its official sanction upon any one of the three theories
of federal taxation to the exclusion of the others. It seems
probable that the narrower and more restricted conceptions of
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the taxing power would, from the standpoint of the practical
problem of judicial construction, prove incapable of satisfactory
enforcement. There is every indication that Congress, if it is
sufficiently circumspect, may continue to exercise a liberal police
power through the medium of regulatory and destructive taxes
without fear of judicial interference.
But if the child labor tax is upheld, either because the Su-
preme Court decides upon broad grounds that the law is consti-
tutional or because it finds its unconstitutionality inaccessible,
Congress will be justified in feeling that it has been substan-
tially fortified in its position that it may use its power to tax as
an instrumentality for the exercise of a broad national police
power. It will be reasonable to look for further and more far-
reaching measures seeking by means of taxation to regulate




This series of articles will be concluded by an article, "The National
Police Power under the Postal Power."
